I.
The German Takeover To talk in England about takeovers and takeover regulation is, to quote the Romans, carrying owls to Athens. My dictionary indicates that this translates into English with the phrase "carrying coals to Newcastle." But in view of the problems with coal and steel anywhere, I
thought I had better stick to the original Roman saying. In any case, Germany has little experience with public takeovers and even less with hostile takeovers, and when we still had the German Takeover Code, this self-regulation was by no means a peer to the City Code.
Therefore, it was the common opinion in Germany that a takeover act was badly needed. This
Act has now been enacted and is in force since January 1 st , 2002. and the public takeovers that will occur in the coming years.
Hostile takeovers are still highly unpopular with many in Germany, particularly with trade unions and labor but also among large parts of German industry and the German press. As everywhere, politicians who live but for reelection reckon with such fears. Therefore, the German takeover act was prepared with great care. First, a so-called discussion draft was issued by the Ministry of Finance in order to prepare the field and to sound out the reactions.
Then an unofficial draft (the ministerial draft) was prepared, taking into consideration the objections made at a public hearing in the Ministry of Finance. Once more a hearing was held.
Finally, on July 11, 2001 , the official governmental draft ("the draft act") was released. This official draft was held back until the outcome of the draft EC 13 th directive on takeovers was clear. The Takeover Act as finally enacted differs substantially from the former drafts. The three major differences concern post-bid defenses, the regulation of general public securities offers, and the price to be offered in a mandatory offer.
Post-Bid Defences. It has been reported widely in the financial press how Volkswagen and the Allgemeine Zeitung. For Germany, this has been worse than a Pyrrhic victory. Post-bid defenses are permissible under section 33 of the Takeover Act with the consent of the general assembly, which can be given in advance, or even with the mere consent of the supervisory board. 2 The Regulation of General Public Securities Offers. The inclusion of general public securities offers in the act is a step forward and helps to lift German securities regulation up to international standards, though details are meeting with critique. This inclusion is reflected in the new name of the act, namely, the Act on Public Securities Offers and Takeovers (Wertpapiererwerbs-und Übernahmegesetz, WpÜG).
The Price to be Offered in a Mandatory
Offer. The new price rules provide for a full pricesharing rule based on the price paid for the securities during a period of three months before the offer, without allowing a discount of up to 15 per cent as under the previous unofficial draft of the act.
b) Takeover Law and Groups of Companies Law: An Uneasy Relationship
The three differences just mentioned concern general, internationally known problems of each takeover regulation. Yet there are two further problems particular to German company and groups of companies law (Konzernrecht). The mandatory bid rule gives the minority shareholders an early right of exit in case of a control shift. Functionally speaking, it is therefore a part of the law of groups, more precisely of the formation of groups. 3 It is already protecting the minority shareholders at that stage. Other means of protection at that stage could be, for example, a mandatory resolution of the general shareholders meeting of the offeree on the control shift. Such a mandatory shareholder resolution rule was indeed proposed early in the German reform discussion on the takeover act, but it was rightly
rejected. It appears in a modified form again in the context of the post-offer defenses, since section 33 subsection 2 of the Takeover Act allows frustrating actions of the managing board if they are based on a shareholder resolution in a general assembly. Of course, the particularity of section 33 is that such a resolution may empower the board before to take defensive action against a future hostile takeover. Traditional company lawyers and academics distrust the mandatory offer rule precisely because they think that in German company law, the problems of the group are dealt with by the provisions of the German Konzernrecht, i.e., mainly ex post when the group has come into existence and is active. A full-fledged control ex ante seems to them to be superfluous beside this set of rules; worse yet, it unbalances it. This fear is particularly acute since the Takeover Act has now made clear that the mandatory offer must be made not only to the shareholders of the offeree company, but also to the shareholders of all its direct and indirect subsidiaries, a rule that has met with harsh criticism from German business. In terms of German Konzernrecht, this means that the mandatory offer has to be made groupwide.
The second problem is closely interrelated to the first. Now that Germany has decided to have a mandatory offer rule-and I am convinced this was the right decision -the question is to be put the other way around: If the mandatory offer already protects minority shareholders at the stage of the formation of the group, are the very detailed and burdensome rules of Konzernrecht still justifiable in their entirety, or does the cumulative application of both sets of rules amount to an overregulation and lead to the plea for deregulating parts (not all) of the German Konzernrecht? Even if the answer were negative, there are a number of difficult harmonization problems between takeover and group law. In particular, it seems strange that the minority shareholders who choose an early exit are under a different protectionist regime, get a different price for their shares, and can avail themselves of a different procedure than those minority shareholders who remain in the group and get an exit right later on in case of the change into a contractual group or in case of a squeeze-out. In the first case, i.e., exit ex ante, the price is made by the stock market, while in the second, i.e., exit ex post, there is a complicated judicial procedure and the price is fixed by the court sometimes many years afterward on the basis of an evaluation given by an outside auditor. This discrepancy has been criticized widely in German law, but there are not yet convincing solutions in sight.
Furthermore, it might be argued that granting an ex ante exit right implies granting also an ex post exit right to those minority shareholders who have remained in the company, at least if they end up being a tiny minority and are themselves subject to a squeeze-out. It then makes sense to give them the possibility of forestalling a squeeze-out by availing themselves of an exit right. 4 
Special Problems of How to Deal with Secrecy and Conflicts of Interest
When Roy Goode asked me to make some observations at this conference and suggested that I comment together with Paul Davies on equality of treatment of target shareholders, I
wondered whether it would not be more interesting for you to tackle a slightly different problem area. Talking about traditional German company law, which denies such an equality, and saying that the Act more or less follows the British example as to pricing rules (one of the differences being the three-month period as compared with the English twelve-month period)
was not an option that turned me on. Just presenting the content of the official German Takeover Act (draft act at that time) would, of course, have been a possibility, but again a hardly challenging one. I decided, therefore, (with the agreement of Roy Goode and his steering group, for which I am grateful) to take up a complex of problems that is considered particularly delicate for German boards and banks, i.e., secrecy and conflicts of interests in takeovers. These problems have an additional acumen in Germany because of the two-tier board structure, the leadership role of the German management board in deciding what is good or bad for the shareholders, labor and the enterprise as a whole, and the traditional but quickly changing structure of the German banking system which is characterized by the full liberty of forming all-purpose banks, called the universal banking system. This may be a good topic for an Oxford Anglo-German Law Conference.
Yet even with this topic I had to learn that quite a number of the issues that are presently being debated in Germany as to secrecy and conflicts of interest in takeovers were already anticipated in the rules and practice of the London Takeover Panel. In addition, most of the secrecy and conflicts of interest problems are not being dealt with specifically in the German Takeover Act. They will remain to be solved either by the supervisory authority-which for takeovers is now the German Federal Supervisory Agency for Financial Services (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungen, BAFin, formerly Federal Supervisory Office on Securities Trading, Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, BAWe)-or suggestions for solutions will be given by German academics in their articles and commentaries.
Ultimately it will be up the courts and, in the last instance, the second senate of the Federal Court of Last Instance (Bundesgerichtshof) to decide these questions and conflicts. Here we see a difference in history and legal and financial culture between the U.K. and Germany; in Germany, the legislators and the judiciary play a comparatively major role in setting the rules, whereas in your country self-regulatory bodies play a major role (is this still correct to say?) and in the context of takeovers there is much reluctance to involve the courts. Maybe I should come back to these differences for a few moments at the end of my lecture. But now I propose to take up a number of problems both as to secrecy and disclosure (part II) and as to conflicts of interest of boards and banks (part III).
II. Secrecy and Disclosure
Secrecy Before an Offer
It is generally agreed that absolute secrecy before an announcement of a takeover offer is of vital importance. Rule 2.1 of the City Code says this expressly and continues to impose secrecy on all persons privy to confidential information, particularly if it is price-sensitive. A similar duty of secrecy was contemplated by the German discussion draft, though there it was confined to the offeror and the persons acting in concert with him. An exception was made insofar as the offeror was permitted to discuss his plans with the offeree and the shareholders of the offeree. The offeree company and its shareholders were also bound to keep the secrecy.
In the hearing, questions were posed about the offeree's permission to discuss the plans with its shareholders, and it was taken for granted that both the offeror and the offeree must be allowed to pass confidential information about the takeover plans on to lawyers, auditors, and banks. Unfortunately, instead of broadening the reach of the secrecy provision as in rule 2.1, the unofficial draft dropped the provision as did the final Act.
The consequence is not that under German law there is no rule on secrecy before the offer.
But this is no longer a specific takeover rule. Instead, a similar rule follows from general company law and the law of obligations for the board and the professionals to whom the board passes on the information. In addition, the duty of secrecy follows from German insider law which, like the British insider law, is under the realm of the EC insider trading directive of 1989. In May 2001, the European Commission came out with a draft directive on market abuse which proposes new rules on market manipulation and is going to integrate the insider prohibition and market manipulation rules. Yet one should realize that the general law and the insider law rules on secrecy do not have the same content and reach as a specific takeover rule on pre-offer secrecy. Insider secrecy, for example, covers only price-sensitive information; takeover secrecy does also, but not necessarily, as rule 2.1 rightly shows. Therefore, it will be up to the Supervisory Authority or, in the last instance, the courts to develop a specific takeover law duty of the offeror, the offeree, and all persons concerned to keep secrecy before the offer.
In this context, it should be mentioned that it is regrettable that the relationship between insider law and takeover law has remained ambiguous under European law. The conflict between insider and takeover law is well known. 5 The temptation to insider trading-e.g., a quick purchase of shares of the target company before the general public, or a timely sale at the impending breakdown of negotiations, or informing third parties-seems especially irresistible at takeovers. 6 It is true that the EC insider trading directive contains a sentence in its preamble which indicates that insider law should be subordinated to takeover law. Yet the extent of this is by no means clear. This lack of clarification was already being criticized with regard to the insider trading directive of 1989, and there were hopes that the 13 th directive would bring some clarifications. 7 Yet quite apart from the final failure of the directive, the approached is about to be increased to include more than a very restricted number of persons.
It should be kept in mind that these uncertainties can be traced back to the European insider trading directive, which implies that doubts as to the interpretation must in the end be referred there is such an impact, it is irrelevant whether the supervisory board has already agreed to or even been informed of the decision of the management board.
In my view, the correct answer is-as is so often the case-in the middle. In general, instant disclosure should be required only when a decision is final within both boards. 10 This is particularly compelling if it is a fundamental business decision that is to be taken by both boards, i.e., for which the management board needs the consent of the supervisory board. If the management board were forced to disclose its internal decision to the general public before, the competence of the supervisory board would be curtailed severely. For quite often after such a public disclosure, there is no way back without heavy financial consequences for the share price, the shareholders, and the enterprise as a whole. This is particularly relevant in view of German labor co-determination, because such an early instant disclosure could render meaningless labor's rights to co-decision on all matters that are up to the supervisory board to decide.
On the other side, there must be exceptions to this rule. Such an exception could be envisaged if the decision of the management board alone already has some legal relevance of its own, in addition to business relevance. A good example is the annual financial statements. It is up to the management board to prepare and complete them and to submit them to the supervisory board together with the proposal for appropriation of distributable profits; after consent of the supervisory board, this is to be presented to the shareholders' meeting. In this case, the fact that the management board has already completed the annual financial statements before passing them on to the supervisory board makes it a legally separate act that obviously may have a palpable impact on the stock price. It would be unwarranted to allow the company to keep this information secret until the consent of the supervisory board or, even less, until the shareholders had met and made up their mind as to the distribution of profits.
The opposite view, which treats every decision of the management board separately as a possibly relevant fact for instant disclosure, is faced with the problem of examining each and every decision of the management board for possible impacts on the stock price. If one looks closely at the criteria used, one finds that this view requires instant disclosure only if there is a high or totally prevailing or at last overwhelming probability that the decision, if made public,
will have an important impact on the stock price. A further disadvantage of the opposite view is its consequence that if the supervisory board refuses to give its consent, the instant disclosure made before must be corrected by the now opposite instant disclosure of the company finally not going forward with its plan. This is bound to create uncertainties and misunderstandings with the investing public, and in the worst case may even undermine investor confidence in the company and its future plans.
It is, therefore, a good move that the Takeover Act contains a provision in its section 10 which states that section 15 WpHG on instant disclosure shall not be applicable for a decision made concerning the making of an offer. In the context of this provision, an offer means not only a mandatory offer or even a takeover offer, but any public offer for a financial instrument. Technically, the provision of the Takeover Act takes precedence over the general instant disclosure provision of general securities regulation. The motives of the Takeover Act make sure to explain that the exemption from instant disclosure is applicable only if the requirements of the rule of the Takeover Act on mandatory publication of the decision to make an offer are fully met. If this is not the case-for instance, if not all information required under section 10 of the Takeover Act is given in the publication of the decision to make an offer-section 15 remains applicable if the decision qualifies for instant disclosure under this section. The wording of section 10 subsection 6 exempts only the decision to make an offer and does not cover the offeree. It is arguable that the aim of this provision can only be reached if the latter is also included by way of teleological interpretation.
A final point should be made as to European law. As explained, section 10 of the Takeover Act constrains section 15 of the German insider law. While this is, of course, no problem under German law since the later and the more special provision takes precedence over the former or more general provision, there might be a problem of European law. German takeover law, which has no basis in European law due to the failure of the 13 th directive, is not permitted to infringe upon the reach of the European insider trading and stock exchange admission directives. The problem of instant disclosure in cases of decisions made by the management board when the consent of the supervisory board is still outstanding is therefore a European problem. If the management board were to be fined for not instantly disclosing its decision, the case could be referred to the European Court of Justice under article 234 (ex-117) of the treaty. This is a clear division of competences and duties between the offeror and the offeree. It is convincing since the prospective offer is relevant in particular for the share price of the offeree, and since a suspension will only be granted by the stock exchange at the request of the company whose shares are to be suspended.
The lack of a similar provision in the German Takeover Act makes it necessary to deal with this problem as a question of general instant disclosure under section 15 WpHG. It is generally agreed that as a matter of principle, it is up to the offeror rather than the offeree to take care of instant disclosure in the context of a prospective takeover offer. The new facts to be published are only those that belong to the sphere of the issuer; general market data, such as the threat of a takeover bid or even mere rumors of the imminence of such a bid, are not included.
However, in some extreme cases, the offeree company may also have a duty of instant disclosure. 11 This may be the case if a friendly takeover is arranged with the cooperation of the board of the offeree company, and if the offeree company issues its own statements that turn out to be wrong in the light of later developments. The guiding principle is that the offeree company must avoid causing the shareholders and the public to be misled by its own interference. Of course, the offeree company must also disclose instantly after the announcement or even after the offer by the offeror if there are new relevant facts within the realm of the offeree company itself which may have a substantial impact on stock prices.
Concerning rumors, the position of German law is that as a matter of principle there is no duty of the company and its board to comment, i.e., no duty of instant disclosure, either for the offeror or for the offeree. Otherwise it would be easy to force a company to disclose information it still wants to keep secret by spreading false rumors. It is true that sometimes a comment as to a false rumor may lie in the interest of the offeree company itself because the price of its securities is affected. But it is felt that the law should not interfere except in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances can arise when an action of the offeror or the offeree has led to the particular rumor as laid down in rule 2.2 (d) of the City Code, or when the offeror has asked for exceptional permission of the supervisory authority not to be held to instant disclosure because the publication of the fact is likely to damage the legitimate interests of the offeror.
d) Instant Disclosure in Group Situations
As is well known, Germany is keen on groups of companies and Konzernrecht. Group law problems also arise in the context of instant disclosure. They have been discussed in Germany only very recently. As a general rule, the duty of instant disclosure is up to the issuer-or in a takeover situation, to the offeror-and not to other members of the group to which the issuer or offeror belongs. 13 There might very well be exceptions to this rule, though they are by no means settled. Two fact patterns should be distinguished. In the first, the relevant information has an impact on the price of the securities of the group member. In the second, the parent had or could have had an influence on the nondisclosure by the subsidiary.
The takeover offer and possibly already the prospective offer may by themselves have financial consequences for the share price of another group member, be it the parent or a subsidiary. Under section 15 WpHG, instant disclosure is to be made by the company in whose field of activity the new fact occurs. A narrow view would hold that the takeover offer occurs only in the field of activity of the offeror, not of other members of the group as long as the parent is not bound to publish consolidated balance sheets including the subsidiary in
question. Yet it could very well be said that the fact that this offer may have a substantial impact on the stock price of the securities of the group member is in itself a fact that occurs in the field of the latter. 14 On the other side, such a rule must avoid forcing a group member to make instant disclosure on a prospective bid by the offeror before the latter has had the opportunity to make an announcement.
The case is quite different if a 100 per cent subsidiary violates the duty of instant disclosure. It is questionable whether the parent has its own direct or indirect responsibility if it is aware of, or even responsible for, this violation. Is it enough to require the parent in such a case to urge the subsidiary to disclose, or might it even be obliged to fulfill the instant disclosure obligation itself? Some go as far as requiring the latter; a few go further and hold even the subsidiary liable for making instant disclosure of facts which have arisen with the parent provided they have an impact on the subsidiary. If one denies these extensive interpretations, the parent may at least become liable as an aider and abettor if it has caused the subsidiary not to comply with its instant disclosure obligation.
Mandatory Disclosure of Shareholdings
In the present context of secrecy in takeovers, mandatory disclosure of shareholders shall be mentioned only briefly. Mandatory disclosure of shareholdings was imposed on the member states by the EC in the transparency directive of 1988 from a threshold of 10 per cent on. In the U.K. and some other states, such mandatory disclosure rules already existed long before and at much lower levels. Usually the level is 5 per cent, such as, for example, in Germany, France, and outside the EU in Switzerland. In France the company may lower this threshold by a provision in its statutes down to 0.5 per cent. In 1989 the UK lowered the threshold to 3 per cent. In addition, there is a provision that the company can require any shareholder or suspected shareholder to disclose the extent, if any, of its beneficial ownership of the company's shares.
It is not clear whether this rule is just a transparency rule or is instead intended to give the management of a company an early warning about a possible future offeror. It may very well be assumed that it is the latter, i.e., a rule against creeping up, though of course this is seldom conceded in the legislative motives. In any case, the rule has an effect on future takeover offers because the management cannot easily be taken by surprise as was the case, for example, under the traditional German company law rule that required disclosure only for stakes of 25 per cent and higher. The rule should, therefore, be discussed in the context of structural impediments to-and, if the company may take action, of pre-bid defenses against-takeovers. 15 If one is convinced that post-bid defensive action is incompatible with the free functioning of the internal market, it is near at hand to extend this reasoning also to pre-bid defenses.
Successive stock purchases by the prospective offeror or the granting of a participation by the Takeover Act are only imposed on the members of the management board, not on the whole board as in the U.K. This is unsatisfactory since the views and intentions of the outside directors, which the supervisory board members usually claim to be, are important for the shareholders and their decision. There is also no provision for split boards, as in note 2 on rule 25.1. According to this, in the case of a split board, the directors who are in a minority should also publish their views and the Panel will normally require that they be circulated by the offeree company. A further substantial lacuna consists in the omission of the act to require the offeree company to obtain competent independent advice and to make it known to the shareholders as provided for in rule 3.1 and rule 25.1 (a) of the City Code. The discussion draft still contained the requirement of advice, though there was no independence requirement. Unfortunately this provision has been dropped with the argument that the offeree company knows quite well itself how to evaluate the offer. It was not understood that the gist of the advice was that it would be made by an independent adviser and it would be made known to the shareholders.
In the hearings on the German discussion act, the question was raised as to whether the views of the board should be backed by a liability provision modeled after the liability provision for the public offer. The drafters of the act shied away from this because they thought that a liability provision might deter the management board from giving a frank view to the
shareholders. Yet this could turn out to be shortsighted, since it may very well be that German courts will hold the board members liable for giving wrong or biased views. A liability provision along the lines of section 12 concerning the public offer document would, strangely enough, better protect the management from liability since, as mentioned above, it is drafted after the model of the rather restrictive stock exchange prospectus liability. Obviously the problem of adviser liability, which in general is rather controversial in German law as well, is not a specific problem of takeover law, though it arises frequently in this context.
White Knights, Inside Information, and Due Diligence
Insider trading activities or violations of secrecy in connection with hostile takeovers usually occur before the bid. Violations after publication of the offer, e.g., at or during the search for a white knight, are the exception, but they do occur. As mentioned above, a person planning to purchase a block of shares or to make a takeover offer that will considerably influence the price of the shares cannot be prevented by insider law from doing so, since treating one's own plans as inside information would not make sense in such cases. This is true for the offeror company and its board, which is allowed to prepare the offer without interference of insider law. Yet for the offeree company and its board, a similar problem arises when they possess inside information about an offer they are going to receive. It is submitted that insider law should not prevent defensive measures by the offeree which are allowed under takeover law, i.e., working together with shareholders and banks in anticipation of a hostile bid as well as searching for a white knight. 18 Yet until the coordination of European insider and takeover law, it is not clear from the insider trading directive and its preamble whether this is actually the content and meaning of European law. If the board of the offeree wants to be sure, it might very well have only one way out-publication.
Another question that is very controversial in German company and takeover law is the legitimate reach of due diligence and, in the specific context of this article, whether the provisions against insider trading limit the normal due diligence examination. Allowing a due diligence examination can be very helpful for the board of the offeree company when searching for a white knight. The motives to the WpHG point out that the giving and receiving of insider information is permissible in the context of selling a block participation. This is the case when an interested party (the white knight) inspects the books of the target company in the course of the due diligence examination and gains inside information in this way. 19 Interestingly enough, rule 21.1 of the City Code states that the principle of equality of information to shareholders does not prevent the furnishing in confidence by an offeree company to a bona fide potential offeror or vice versa.
Obviously, the board of the offeree company in a hostile takeover will not and must not permit the hostile offeror a due diligence examination. However, if a prospective white knight has been allowed to inspect the books of the offeree company in a due diligence exercise, the question is whether the same information must be given to the offeror. The German _Act is silent on this point and the problem is hardly ever mentioned. It seems that German law would not require the passing on of information given or allowed to be taken by the white knight to the offeror. Rule 20.2 of the City Code, which deals with equality of information to competing offerors, is more specific. It requires that any information given to one offeror or potential offeror must, on request, be given equally and promptly to another offeror or bona fide potential offeror even if that other offeror is less welcome. This requirement, however, will usually only apply when there has been a public announcement of the existence of the offeror or potential offeror to which information has been given. This seems to be balanced well, though it must be seen that the requirement that the less welcome offeror should specify the questions to be answered ("on request") may prevent full equality. In practice, of course, the catalog of questions can be expected to be lengthy. Even more difficult questions arise in the case of management buy-outs.
Purchases beyond the earlier company commitment (alongside purchases) attributable to the exploitation of inside information are not permitted, either to the offeror or to the offeree. 20 This is true also for the purchaser of a participation who, after obtaining inside information from a due diligence examination, acquires even more shares than planned earlier, either on or off the exchange.
III. Conflicts of Interest of Boards and Banks

Board Responsibility Beyond Shareholders' Interests Under General Company Law
When dealing with conflicts of interest of the board in takeover situations, it is not my intention to deal generally with the question of how the opposite interests of the offeror and the shareholders of the offeree company and of the latter and their board should be balanced.
After all, this is what takeover regulation is all about. Furthermore, one of the most controversial conflict of interest situations in takeovers, i.e., the conflict of interest of the board of the offeree when faced with a hostile takeover and the respective problem of post-bid defenses, has been omitted here. 21 Instead, only specific conflicts of interest of boards and banks shall be discussed. Still, one word on allowing post-bid defenses-as in the U.S. As to frustrating a takeover offer, it has been argued under German company and takeover law that quite apart from the general business judgment rule for the management board under section 76, it is not up to the management board to make decisions on the composition of the company's shareholders. 23 If this general principle is accepted as the majority view in Germany, fundamental decisions on the composition of the company's shareholders, including post-bid frustrating action, are up to all shareholders in general assembly. The
German Takeover states in section 33 that post-bid defensive actions need to be authorized either by the supervisory board or by the general assembly. As to the second possibility the principal development in this section, which was proposed in vain by Germany for the 13 th directive and has now been laid down in subsection 2, is that the general assembly may issue such an authorization up to 18 months before the actual offer. It is quite obvious that before having had the opportunity of seeing the actual offer, the shareholders cannot really evaluate whether it is worthwhile or not, and practitioners doubt that such authorization will be sought by many boards and accepted by many general assemblies. Indeed, such a shareholder resolution could signal that the enterprise considers itself a candidate for takeover, which may have unwelcome consequences at the stock market.
It remains to mention that these objections toward creating and maintaining such a conflict of interest for the board do not extend to the information to be given to the workers. Indeed, such duties of information not only to shareholders but also to workers are to be found in many takeover regulations, including the German one and the draft 13 th directive.
Inducement Fees, Views of the Board, and Conflicts of Interest
If one talks about conflicts of interest of directors, one thinks of the classic cases of selfdealing, corporate opportunity, excessive remuneration, and competing with the company. This is discussed elsewhere 24 and shall not be treated here. Instead, we shall take up the phenomenon of inducement fees, which seems to be relatively recent in Europe.
According to the new rule 21.2 of the City Code, which was preceded by a Panel statement of July 16, 1999 , and enacted last year, an inducement fee is "an arrangement which may be entered into between an offeror or a potential offeror and the offeree company pursuant to which a cash sum will be payable by the offeree company if certain specified events occur which have the effect of preventing the offer from proceeding or causing it to fail (e.g., the recommendation by the offeree company board of a higher competing offer). In Germany, these kinds of arrangements are not yet commonly known or discussed. But it is, of course, just a question of time until the same clauses will also be used here more broadly in takeover practices. The legal treatment of such promises is ambiguous. In a certain light, they are the opposite of frustrating actions in the sense of section 33 because they facilitate the offer by giving a certain assurance to the offeror. Yet, of course, by the same token they reduce the success chances of a possible competing offer. Insofar they must be considered to be potentially frustrating, at least if they amount to more than a small fraction of the offer value in question. In this respect, the exception under section 33 par. 1 sentence 2 of the Takeover Act might come in. It allows action that an orderly and conscientious director of a company not subject to a takeover offer would undertake. If the inducement fee is just enough to assure that the prospective offeror does not make a distinct loss when his offer is not accepted, this would probably be all right. Beyond this it is questionable, however, whether the board does not fetter its discretion by making such a promise either in the name of the company or for itself. Yet under the general business judgment clause of section 76 of the Aktiengesetz, this is difficult to detect. There is no doubt that at least full disclosure of such fees should be made. But again it is difficult to find a basis for requiring such a disclosure.
Neither the information required to be contained in the offer statement according to section 11 of the Takeover Act and the pertinent provisions of the regulation, nor the mandatory content of the views of the board according to section 27 of the Takeover Act, contains such a disclosure statement. It could possibly be argued that since the management board of the offeree has to give its views on the offer and reasons for them, it must also disclose such facts that might be relevant for evaluating these views in the eyes of an ordinary shareholder. If one considers the duty of the board to give its views as a professional duty of information toward investors, this might bring this duty under the general theory and case law of duty of information and advice by professionals. In this body of law, it is commonly agreed that the information must be true, complete, and clearly understandable for the recipient. 25 It follows that inducement fees are to be disclosed in the views of the board of the offeree, if a reasonable shareholder would consider this information as possibly relevant for his decision of whether or not to trust the views of the board in making his own decision on accepting or not accepting the takeover offer. What is lacking in German takeover law is the confirmation by an independent adviser of the offeree that the inducement fee is in the interest of the offeree. Such a confirmation of an independent adviser who might make himself liable may very well be more valuable than the duty of the management board to act in the interest of the company and its disclosure of having entered into such a fee arrangement. Once more the lacuna in the Takeover Act of not requiring independent advice to the offeree proves to be harmful for the shareholders.
Conflicts of Interest of Banks in Takeovers: A Special Problem for Continental
European All-Purpose Banks
Conflicts of interest in takeovers may become particularly relevant for German banks. This is so because in Germany and some other Continental European states, such as Switzerland and Austria, the so-called all-purpose or universal banking system prevails. Under this system there is no mandatory separation of credit banks and investment banks as there formerly was under the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S., nor is there a common practice of not combining these functions. It is well known that these combinations may lead to considerable conflicts of interest. This has been described elsewhere. Here some specific conflicts of interest situations for banks in takeovers shall be mentioned and possible solutions shall be discussed. I have omitted the conflicts that arise from inside information in respect to a bank's own security dealings or those carried out by bank-owned fund managers, including the interesting note 5 on rule 4.1 and 4.2 of the City Code which prohibits dealing contrary to published advice, and I shall leave aside the question raised in the English Mannesmann v. Goldmann Sachs
International case on how to restrain an adviser from acting on a takeover.
The most prominent German case was the intended takeover offer of Krupp to the shareholders of Mannesmann in March 1997. This was not only memorable because of its status as the first public threat of a serious hostile takeover as mentioned above, but also because of the conflict of interest in which one of the then Big Three (private German banks) ended up and for which it was severely criticized in the German press and in German business. The bank had deputized one member of its management board into the supervisory board of Thyssen. Later on, the bank was approached by Krupp to render advisory and financial services in the planned takeover offer transaction. The bank agreed to do so, becoming-at least according to the information known to the public-the first large German private bank ready to support a hostile bid. This was a spectacular turnaround in German Such a special incompatibility rule is, for example, a rule requiring the board member to step down if a takeover might be upcoming that would bring him in a situation of conflict of
interest. Yet it is very doubtful whether such special incompatibility rules work in practice.
Takeover plans are kept secret, and once a takeover offer can be foreseen, it might already be too late. More important, if the bank deputy steps down, this might give rise to speculation and rumors about possible takeovers or differences of opinion between the enterprise and the bank. In any case, the fact that the bank has deputized one of its management board members to the board of the prospective offeree company does not hinder the bank from accepting the invitation of the offeror to render it services in the coming takeover by advice and financing.
Deputizing somebody is neither equivalent to a promise not to help a possible offeror even in a hostile bid, nor does it bring with it a fiduciary duty of this kind. It is self-evident that the bank deputy may not pass inside information from the board of the company to the bank, nor from the bank board to the company. As laid down in the Schaffgotsch case and as generally agreed, board secrecy has precedence over the duties of the bank deputy to his own bank. Other problems relate to the legitimate reach of due diligence and whether the provisions against insider trading limit the normal due diligence examination. If a prospective white knight has been allowed to inspect the books of the offeree company in a due diligence exercise, it is unclear under German law whether the same information must be given to the offeror.
As to conflicts of interest of boards and banks it must be remembered that under section 76 of the German stock corporation act (AktG), the management board has direct responsibility for the management of the company. This responsibility reaches beyond the shareholders and includes the interest of the employees and even the common good. The problem with this constituency rule is similar to a general business judgment rule concerning post-bid defenses.
The rule sounds very good, but it is not possible for the shareholders or the workers to check whether the judgment of the management board is valid. In the end, the rule results in decisions maximizing managers' utility. According to the majority view, under section 76
AktG it is not up to the management board to make decisions on the composition of the do not belong to the Deutsche Bank group, and that supervisory board members must disclose conflicts of interests to the president of the supervisory board (and the president himself to the presidial committee). The best way of dealing with conflicts of interest is to prevent them from coming into existence. This can be done by Chinese walls, the principle of general incompatibility, or rules of special incompatibility. Under German law and possibly also under UK law, at least after Bolkiah, establishing Chinese walls is not considered a safe haven in itself for the bank or another party subject to conflicts of interest. General and special incompatibility rules are problematic. It remains to try to solve the conflict of interests in a takeover when the offer is prepared or has already been made and questions arises as to how the bank and the bank deputy in the offeree company should behave. There seem to be at least four possibilities: abstaining from voting, exclusion from deliberation, stepping down, and revocation of office. As to the choice between rule of law and self-regulation, there are major differences in history, corporate governance, and financial culture between the UK and Germany. They are related to history or, as one says today, they are path-dependent.
